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Abstract 
The increased frequency of the adoption of service-based business models by manufacturers, such 
as solution provision, has given rise to service triads. While there is consensus that actors in service 
triads are relationally and performatively interdependent, less is understood about how service 
triads are controlled and coordinated. In this study, we use an inductive case-based approach to 
build an understanding about the roles, approaches, and contextual factors that influence how 
service triads are controlled and coordinated. We collected and analyzed data from nine companies 
forming three service triads, each comprising a customer, a manufacturer of an asset, and a service 
supplier. We synthesized our findings in a theoretical framework, where we show that; first, both, 
control and coordination are present in service triads rather than just control as previously posited. 
Second, controlling and coordinating service triads is not a single actor’s responsibility but rather 
a collective effort shared by two or three actors. Third, we uncovered four contingent factors that 
influence the dynamics of how service triads are controlled and coordinated: the customer’s risk 
exposure due to the offering’s failure, the substitutability of the offering, the contractual 
safeguards, and the relationship closeness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The increasing popularity of service-based business models, such as the provision of 
integrated solutions (cf. Tuli, Kohli, & Bharadwaj, 2007), combined with firms’ increasing 
specialization is giving rise to a network-centric mode of solution delivery (Wynstra, Spring, & 
Schoenherr, 2015; Karatzas, Johnson, & Bastl, 2016). This allows firms to respond to customer 
demands through increasingly customized and complex offerings, often incorporating multi-
vendor technologies, products, and services (Story et al., 2016). For example, IBM in industrial 
computing or General Electric, John Deere, and Caterpillar in complex industrial equipment 
strongly rely on the existence of service capabilities in their dealerships or technology suppliers to 
create customized solutions that address their customers’ needs (Cusumano, Kahl, & Suarez, 
2014).  
In this arrangement, the three key actors that form a service triad are: a) the manufacturer 
of an asset who typically bundles the asset with services and sells the offering as a solution to its 
customer; b) the service supplier that supplies the service capability of the solution directly to the 
manufacturer’s customer; and c) the manufacturer’s customer, which buys the solution (Wynstra 
et al., 2015; Karatzas et al., 2016). In service triads, all three actors are performance and 
relationship interdependent (Choi et al., 2002; Wu & Choi, 2005; Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 
2008; Li & Choi 2009; Choi & Wu, 2009a; b), which in consequence means that the effectiveness 
of the provision of services, and ultimately the customer’s satisfaction, is dependent upon how 
effectively the three actors and the relationships between them are controlled (Li & Choi, 2009; 
Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 2011). In addition to relationships being formally controlled by 
governance apparatus such as contracts and performance measures, relationships can also be 
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managed informally (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) through coordination via “information sharing, 
decision-making, and feedback mechanisms” (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2011, p. 543).  
Managerial practice is replete with challenges to the delivery of services and solutions 
(Kreye, 2017), such as the deservitization of customer offerings (Valtakoski, 2017), to termination 
of service contracts, such as Intel’s $150 million web-based service unit shut down (Sawhney, 
Balasubramanian, & Krishnan, 2004). In many cases, the difficulties are rooted in the naiveté of 
the complexity of the control and coordination of the activities of the three actors in a service triad. 
Thus, how service triads are controlled and coordinated is of interest to scholars and practitioners 
alike. 
With few notable exceptions, the extant research on how to control and coordinate service 
triads is limited (cf. Wynstra et al., 2015). It has been argued that the responsibility for the control 
and coordination of the triad lies, depending on the context, with the prime contractor (e.g., 
Karatzas et al., 2016) outsourcer of services (Li & Choi, 2009; Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 
2011), or the seller of the solution (Windahl & Lakemond, 2006; Bastl et al., 2012; Karatzas et al., 
2016). Structurally, these are the same actor, whose key role is to retain control and visibility over 
the triadic interactions with the aim of facilitating the effective delivery of the offering to the 
customer.  
Contrary to the extant literature, we argue that the manufacturer of an asset (later on 
referred to as ‘manufacturer’ for brevity) is likely not the only actor in a service triad that has an 
interest in the coordination and control of triadic interactions. Customers, for example, are not only 
the providers of inputs in the service production process (Sampson, 2000), but they also have to 
develop a range of capabilities around the internal and external integration and management of 
risks associated with dependence on service suppliers to effectively participate in the provision of 
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solutions (Story et al., 2016). Due to performance interdependence in service triads, the failure of 
the customer offering or a conflict in the relationship between the manufacturer and its customer 
can have negative implications for the service supplier, such as difficulties in service delivery, a 
decrease in revenues, and reputational damage (Karatzas et al., 2016). Furthermore, we posit that 
in order to advance our understanding of control and coordination in service triads, we need to 
move beyond some of the limited methodological choices of the extant triadic research, such as 
the focus on a single actor (e.g. Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 2011, Li and Choi, 2009) or a 
single dyad (e.g. Karatzas et al., 2016) within a triad.  
In this research we aim to understand how and why activities and relationships are 
controlled and coordinated within service triads. We do this, by using an inductive theory 
generation approach. We collected and analyzed data from nine companies forming three service 
triads. We captured our findings in nine propositions and synthesized them in a theoretical 
framework, which constitutes the theoretical contribution of this work. While the extant literature 
on ‘managing’ triads focuses almost exclusively on control in service triads (e.g. Li & Choi, 2009; 
Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 2011), we show that for the effective functioning of a service triad, 
both control and coordination should be present. Related to this, we explicate the role of the 
‘mediator’, which displays behavioral traits unique to the context of service triads. Second and 
contrary to the extant literature, which focuses only on one actor managing service triads (e.g., Li 
& Choi, 2009, Karatzas et al., 2016), the control and coordination of service triads is performed 
by at least two actors. Third and finally, we uncovered four contextual factors that influence the 
dynamics of the control and coordination of service triads: a) risk exposure due to the customer 
offering’s failure, b) the substitutability of the customer offering, c) contractual safeguards, and d) 
relationship closeness. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we present a theoretical 
background on service triads, interdependence within those and their control and coordination. We 
then introduce the methodology explaining our empirical setting, case sampling logic, data 
collection and data analysis processes. Following this is the within-case analysis and cross-case 
analysis, where we formulate our propositions and synthesize them in a theoretical framework. We 
continue with the discussion of our findings and close with limitations and recommendations for 
further research.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we review the literature that defines the characteristics of service triads and 
summarizes the extant theoretical understanding on how to manage them.  
 
Service Triads 
Service triads have become an important topic in the supply chain management discipline 
(Wynstra et al., 2015). In comparison to manufacturing triads, service triads typically involve three 
distinct actors—a manufacturer, a service supplier, and a customer (Karatzas et al., 2016)—as 
opposed to manufacturing triads, where one manufacturer interacts with two suppliers (Wu & 
Choi, 2005; Wu, Choi, & Rungtusanatham, 2010) or with a supplier and a customer (Rossetti & 
Choi, 2005, 2008). While we acknowledge that multiple suppliers may provide service to a 
manufacturer, similar to how multiple suppliers may supply components or parts in a 
manufacturing context, our focus is on a service supplier-manufacturer-customer triad.  
In the manufacturing triad, the component supplier normally does not have to interact with 
the manufacturer’s customer, as there is no relationship between them. In contrast, the service 
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supplier has to have a direct interaction—that is, a relationship—with the manufacturer’s 
customer. The service supplier’s direct interaction with the manufacturer’s customer is a key 
characteristic that defines service triads and distinguishes them from manufacturing triads (Li & 
Choi, 2009; Wynstra et al., 2015).  
The direct interaction between the customer and the service supplier exists due to the 
inseparability of services and the bi-directionality of service exchanges (Sampson, 2000; Sampson 
& Froehle, 2006), where “service cannot be divorced from an exchange relationship between 
specific counterparts” (Wynstra et al., 2015, p. 7). As Sampson and Froehle (2006) posit, the 
customer and the service supplier are engaged in a bi-directional service production flow, where 
the customer is simultaneously the supplier of significant inputs in service co-production. Thus, 
we distinguish the focus of our study from other types of services, such as mixed services—
involving a mix of face-to-face and loosely coupled back office work or quasi-manufacturing 
services, which entail virtually no face-to-face contact (Chase, 1981). 
While the fundamental nature of service triads is known (Choi & Wu, 2009a; b), studies 
that explore the control and coordination of tasks and relationships in manufacturer – service 
supplier – customer triads are rare. Few triadic studies have, to date, fully leveraged the unique 
characteristics of service triads (Wynstra et al., 2015. Thus, in the following section we provide an 
overview of the extant understanding of service triads, control and coordination in service triads, 
and conclude with the research question that led to our empirical investigation.  
 
 
Interdependency in Service Triads 
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Service triads, as considered here, are transitive triads. They are structurally complete as all 
three actors (customer, manufacturer, and service supplier) are connected through relationships, 
and there are no structural holes (Madhavan, Gnyawali, & Jinyu, 2004). Consequently, all three 
actors are performance and relationship interdependent (Li & Choi, 2009; Mena, Humphries, & 
Choi, 2013). The reason for this is that in a triad (Choi & Wu, 2009a): 
a) A node can affect an indirect link—for instance, the manufacturer’s behavior affects the 
relationship between the service supplier and the manufacturer’s customer; and  
b) A link can affect another link or a node—for example, the relationship between the 
manufacturer and the service supplier can affect the service supplier and/or the relationship 
between the service supplier and the customer. 
This interdependence was demonstrated in the work of Karatzas et al. (2016), where the authors 
showed that the customer’s (third-party logistics provider) satisfaction with a service supplier’s 
(service garage) service performance is influenced by the manufacturer’s (commercial vehicle 
manufacturer) management of the relationship with the service supplier across multiple 
relationship dimensions. 
As the actors within service triads are interdependent, the relationships within the triad should 
be maintained. Simmel (1950) posits that actors within triads can adopt one of two roles to 
maintain the triad, 1) the mediator, and 2) the arbitrator. These roles are similar to those of a Tertius 
Iungens (cf. Obstfeld, 2005) – or the third that joins. Both the arbiter and the mediator are interested 
in the unity of the triad, not the interests of the individual. Conversely, actors that adopt the role 
of Tertius Gaudens (or the one that enjoys) wish to create discord and separation between the other 
two actors. However, while the mediator is non-partisan, either through no interest or equal interest 
in the other two actors, the arbitrator is partisan and favors one actor over another (Simmel, 1950). 
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We suggest that within service triads, actors will adopt a role more in line with the non-partisan 
mediator as favoring one actor over another would lead to adverse tensions in the inter-
organizational relationships between actors, leading to a decay of relationships within the triad, 
reducing interdependence and hence reductions in the overall performance of the triad. 
 
Control and coordination in service triads 
As a customer’s satisfaction within service triads is dependent upon the relationship 
between the customer and the focal firms supplier (cf. Karatzas et al. 2016) the focal firm has to 
be able to control and coordinate the relationships and tasks between the two remaining actors. 
However, control and coordination have occasionally been conflated (cf. Fugate, Sahin, & 
Mentzer, 2006; Xu & Beamon, 2006; Holweg & Pil, 2008) with little equivocality about their 
relationship nor any distinct definitional clarity. In fact, coordination is viewed as a component of 
control. Here, we posit that they are related but distinct in the mechanisms through which they are 
exerted. 
Control is exerted through the managing actor’s ability to maintain communication and 
monitor the behavior and performance of the other two actors. In the work of Li & Choi (2009) 
and Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, (2011), this managing actor is a firm – referred to as the buyer, 
that subcontracts the provision of services to its customers to a service supplier. However, to 
achieve control, the best position in a network is to be in the position of the bridge (Burt, 1992); 
this is the actor that is positioned between two isolated agents that are not directly connected with 
each other. For example, a manufacturer is a bridge if it has relationships with two suppliers who 
are not connected to each other via a relationship. The absence of a connection between the isolated 
agents creates a structural hole, which in turn grants the bridge informational and control benefits 
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as it can negotiate and exploit information to its benefit (Burt, 2000; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). 
However, in transitive service triads, structural holes do not exist as all actors need to be connected 
to ensure the effective delivery of services (Bastl et al., 2012; Karatzas et al., 2016). Thus, there is 
no bridge position and control becomes more challenging.  
Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden (2011) and Van Iwaarden and Van der Valk (2013) 
suggest that a mechanism for the effective retention of control by the buyer (which is structurally 
the same actor as the manufacturer in this study) is the deployment of a behavior- and outcome-
based contract mix in direct links, as the buyer has no ability to influence the indirect relationship 
(i.e. between the customer and service supplier). Hence, in addition to control being exerted 
through an actor’s position, it can also be achieved via formalized mechanisms. This suggests that 
control is a proxy of the position of an actor within a network and the actor’s power1 (cf. Simmel, 
1950). Power has been shown to be a control mechanism in supply chains (Handley & Benton Jr., 
2012a; 2012b), however control can be exerted through other mechanisms. These include 
information monitoring (Handley & Benton Jr., 2012b), operating procedures, and action and 
diagnostic controls (Chenhall, 2003) such as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). 
In addition to control within the dyads in the triad, it is important to understand how 
coordination between actors (cf. Gulati, 2007; Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelazkov, 2012) within 
the triad occurs as coordination is fundamental to supply chain management (Fugate et al., 2006). 
Coordination is not well defined within the O&SCM literature. However, a supply chain is said to 
be coordinated when “all decisions are aligned to accomplish global system objectives” (Sahin & 
Robinson, 2002, p. 507). This aligns with definitions within general management where 
                                                 
 
1 Power is defined here as: “the ability of one individual or group to control or influence the behaviour of another” 
(Hunt & Nevin, 1974, p.186) 
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coordination is the alignment and adjustment of activities, processes, and roles (Gulati et al., 2012). 
Coordination is achieved through information sharing (Sahin & Robinson, 2005), mutual 
adjustment of activities (Nassimbeni, 1998), and decision-making and feedback mechanisms 
(Gulati et al. 2012). Table 1 compares the different mechanisms for exerting control and 
coordination in inter-organizational relationships. 
 
------- Insert Table 1 about here ------- 
 
Greater interdependence and higher task and environmental uncertainty are posited to 
require more coordination (Xu & Beamon, 2006; Gulati et al., 2012). In service triads 
interdependence is high, thus task and environmental uncertainty will require differing levels of 
coordination. Task and environment uncertainty is also increased by greater investment in 
relationship-specific assets (Handley & Benton Jr., 2012b). Relationship-specific investments in 
assets that provide customized support and/or manufacturing processes, have little value outside 
of a focal relationship. Asset specificity refers to the degree to which the assets used in support of 
the transaction can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of 
productive value (Williamson, 1991; David & Han, 2004). Hence, the greater the asset specificity 
the lower the level of available substitutes. 
It has been posited that task and environment uncertainty can be reduced by a dominant 
actor – through exertion of mediated power - by information monitoring (Handley & Benton Jr., 
2012a) and contractual safeguards (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). However, we argue that if 
actors in a triad act for the benefit of the whole triad, information sharing (cf. Sahin & Robinson, 
2005), a coordination mechanism, can be used to mitigate the uncertainty. 
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The mechanisms of control and coordination and what affects their deployment are well 
understood within a dyad. However, who does the control and coordination in service triads, and 
for what reason, remains unanswered. The role of coordinating and controlling activities and 
relationships in the triad is assigned to one actor—the manufacturer, who is in most cases also the 
prime contractor (cf. Bastl et al., 2012; Finne & Holmström, 2013). However, we posit that in the 
pursuit of the effective provision of services to the end customer, the manufacturer is not the only 
actor that coordinates and controls the service triad. As highlighted earlier, the customer is actively 
involved in service co-production with the service supplier by providing inputs to the service 
production process (Sampson & Froehle, 2006). All three actors are performance-interdependent 
due to the unique structural arrangement of service triads (Madhavan et al., 2004) and due to the 
complementary capabilities necessary for the service provision (Story et al., 2016). This makes the 
provision of services a collective effort by all three actors as well as a potential collective risk if 
the offering fails. Moreover, this additional actor “may not be specifically chosen, nor be known 
or designated as such” (Simmel, 1950, p.148). Hence, within a service triad an additional actor 
that coordinates and controls actions may emerge. Thus, there is little in the way of theoretical 
clarity as to whether there is only one, or two or more actors that coordinates and controls actions 
in a triad. 
 Given the nascent state of the extant literature, we argue that our understanding of 
managing service triads is incomplete and mostly limited to the perspective of one actor. 
Accordingly, we have yet to understand the roles of the customer and the service supplier. Thus, 
the purpose of this study is to understand how and why activities and relationships are controlled 
and coordinated within service triads. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Given the underexplored nature of the research phenomenon under study, we adopted an 
inductive case-based approach with abductive reasoning to generate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Meredith, 1998; Yin, 2009; Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). In line with suggestions by Edmondson & 
McManus (2007), case research represents a “methodological fit” when used for exploring novel 
questions, of how and why (as is the intent of this study), and where the primary contribution of 
the work is a suggestive theory, often resulting in the invitation for further work on the issue or set 
of issues elucidated by the study. Moreover, case research enables researchers to document 
managerial practices, gain greater understanding of the nature and complexity of the phenomenon 
under study (Voss, Tsikriktsis & Frohlich, 2002; Yin, 2009), and increase the depth of the research 
(Meredith, 1998). 
 
Case Sampling 
Following the theoretical sampling logic and recommendations by Eisenhardt (1989), 
Meredith (1998), and Patton (2002), we selected our cases based on the set of selection criteria, 
which we developed from the extant literature:  
 Criterion 1—Transitivity: The actors in a service triad must form a transitive triad—that 
is, all actors are connected through relationships, hence no structural holes exist between 
the actors (Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Madhavan et al., 2004). Transitivity is one of the 
basic structural characteristics of service triads (Wynstra et al., 2015).  
 Criterion 2—Existing relationships: This enables the observation of longer-term 
relationships, which tend to mature and accumulate significant relational history (Anderson 
& Narus, 1990). Moreover, this criterion allows us to examine the relationships that were 
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more stable with less exposure to the uncertainties of new relationships or ones that were 
at the end of their lifespan. 
 Criterion 3—Presence of different control and coordination mechanisms: As the focus of 
our study is on control and coordination mechanisms within service triads, triads were 
chosen that used a range of control and coordination mechanisms (Van der Valk & Van 
Iwaarden, 2011; Gulati et al., 2012; Van Iwaarden & Van der Valk, 2013). 
 Criterion 4—Differing levels of task and environment uncertainty: This follows from the 
preceding criterion. As we were examining differing levels of control and coordination, we 
required cases that had differing levels of task and environmental uncertainty as these are 
posited to require different levels of coordination (Xu & Beamon, 2006; Gulati et al., 
2012). Although in each of the three cases, all three actors are connected through the 
provision, support, and use of the same offering, they have distinct roles, responsibilities 
and exposure to risk. This results in variations in environmental uncertainty to which each 
actor is exposed, and consequently variation in the deployment of control and coordination 
mechanisms. In Case 2 asset specificity was low as vehicles were interchangeable. 
Conversely, in Case 3 the solution was entirely specific to the customer. 
 
Data Collection Process 
Each case was comprised of three firms forming a service triad. The unit of reference was 
the customer-manufacturer-service supplier triad, where the units of analysis were relationships 
within the customer-manufacturer, customer-service supplier, and manufacturer-service supplier 
dyads. 
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For the purposes of data collection, a semi-structured interview guide was developed. The 
guide stipulated triadic relational issues by focusing on the uncovering of control and coordination 
mechanisms, interdependence, and how and why the mechanisms were utilized for each actor 
within the case service triads. 
The data collection for every case started with the identification of a “gatekeeper” firm. 
Potential gatekeeper firms were identified on the basis of our knowledge of their involvement in 
the provision of solutions sourced from the business press, academic papers, and existing personal 
networks. We approached them, introduced the project, and among others explained the sampling 
criteria, ensuring they were understood and emphasized the need for all three firms in a triad to 
comply with them. Based on this, the gatekeeping firm’s representative first identified potential 
participating firms and asked for their willingness to participate. Once the preliminary agreement 
to participate was reached, the research team approached the other two firms, briefly explained the 
project again, and re-checked the firm’s compliance with the case selection criteria.  
The case interviews started with the CEO or VP of the gatekeeper firms. During the 
interview, the CEO or VP would mention who else within their firm was involved in relationship 
management with the two other firms in the triad. S/he would then introduce us to a knowledgeable 
purchasing or key account manager familiar with the solution under study and directly involved in 
managing the relationship with the other actors. These interviews were used to learn further about 
the other managers involved in the relationship management with the other two participating firms 
who are their counterparts. In this way, we identified all relevant participants from all involved 
firms per triad. Prior to each interview, we sought permission to electronically record the interview 
for the purposes of verbatim transcribing and subsequent data analysis. Permission was granted 
from all participants. Details of the case companies and participants are summarized in Table 2. 
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------- Insert Table 2 about here ------- 
 
To ensure reliability of the study – i.e., transparency of case study execution and replication 
- we developed (Yin, 2009): a) a research protocol, consisting of data collection process and data 
collection instrument; and b) case study database for all three cases, which included interview 
transcripts, company documentation, and notes from site visits. 
To strengthen construct validity - i.e. the correct conceptualization and operationalization 
of the relevant constructs - we employed several tactics (cf. Jick, 1979; Yin 2009): Firstly, we 
grounded our protocol in the extant literature. We then combined primary and secondary data that 
was aligned with these theoretical conceptualizations. Secondary data were collected in the form 
of company documents, such as organizational charts, performance reports, and descriptions of 
products, services, and solutions. We combined this with site visits to deepen our understanding 
of a particular business context. We then established a chain of evidence from the objectives of 
the study, from the design of the data collection protocol, to the case study database, on to data 
coding, to individual within case study reports. Finally, each within-case study report was verified 
for accuracy by case participants and subsequently corrected if necessary.  
 Internal validity – which is concerned with building plausible relationships between 
constructs (Yin, 2009), was ensured by employing pattern matching and identification of 
commonalities between quotes, codes and extant theory; leading to identification of common 
themes and generalizations across the three cases. Lastly, the generalizations were captured in 
propositions and enfolded with the existing body of knowledge in the cross-case analysis and 
proposition development section in order for internal validity to be maintained.  
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Given the nascence of the phenomena under study and the inductive nature of our inquiry, 
the pursuit of statistical generalizability of our findings was not of primary concern. Dyer and 
Wilkins (1991) argue that theories born from deep inquiry will be more accurate and more 
appropriately tentative, as researchers must take into account the particularities and qualification 
of specific contexts.  One way to increase external validity of findings is through generalization to 
theory and use of replication logic (Yin, 2009). This is ensured in this study through a careful 
selection of the three cases studies based on the predetermined criteria derived from the extant 
literature, which allowed us to identify patterns in the data leading to generalizations across the 
selected cases. 
 
Data Analysis 
Given that the extant literature provides little insight into coordination and control in 
service triads, an inductive case research approach was used (Eisenhardt, 1989). In line with 
Mantere and Ketokivi’s (2013) suggestions, this allowed us to move from an observation of the 
phenomena, to an explanation of why the phenomena occurred, to the prescription of some rules 
(in our case propositions) as to how the control and coordination of service triads takes place. Our 
analysis was comprised of four-stages (Corbin & Strauss, 1990): 1) micro-analysis of the data 
corpus, 2) grouping into open codes, 3) consolidation of the open codes into focused codes, and 4) 
collapsing the focused codes into selective or theoretical codes. The actions taken in these stages 
are detailed below. While the cases were inductive, our reasoning was abductive, where we sought 
inference to the best explanation (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). When inferring, we sought to remain 
faithful to the meanings of the respondents to our enquiry while maintaining connections to 
potential theoretical explanations.  
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Given this study elicited responses to enquiry from multiple interviewees in nine 
participating firms, we paid particular attention to identify and resolve any differences in opinions. 
In line with field observations by John & Rene (1982) and Anderson et al. (2016), we found 
participants in significant agreement, due our questions focusing on the structural characteristics 
of relationships such as formalization (e.g. formal vs informal controls) and decision-making roles 
(which include coordination decisions and roles). In the few situations where we encountered 
differences in opinions we: a) compared our interpretations of the data between researchers; b) 
triangulated the conflicting interpretations with other participants that were knowledgeable about 
the subject matter and c). showed our findings and analysis to the informants to check for accuracy 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1984; Yin, 2009).  
In the first stage of the data analysis, in vivo coding (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014) 
was conducted on verbatim transcripts. The purpose of this stage was to provide us with an 
understanding of the data and begin to clarify whether there were emergent themes within the data. 
In the second stage of the analysis. we generated open codes from the in vivo coding in an 
inductive manner. Retaining the thick descriptions allowed us to contextualize our nascent findings 
more thoroughly as the data remained connected to the empirical setting (cf. Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013).  
The third stage of our analysis involved the consolidation of the open codes into focused 
codes through further inductive reasoning. To fulfill the prescriptive criterion of inductive case 
research (cf. Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013), this stage was conducted independently by the three 
researchers to determine the level of inter-rater agreement. In this stage, it was 94%. Table A-1 
(see Appendix A) provides insight into the focused codes.  
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The fourth and final stage involved collapsing the focused codes into selective (or 
theoretical) codes in an abductive manner and determining if there were linkages between the 
codes based on our micro-analyses of the data.  
 
RESULTS 
Within-Case Descriptions 
For each case, a detailed within-case report was written. Reports are based on triangulated 
data collected from case participants and secondary data from firm’s documentation and site visits. 
Special attention was being paid to provide as internally consistent and as objective descriptions 
as possible and to minimize subjective interpretations.  
We present each within-case description in the form of a short descriptive background, two 
graphics, and a summary table, which are all based on original within-case thick descriptions (cf. 
Gioia et al., 2013). For each case, we open with a short background on the roles of individual 
actors, the type of solution being sold, and a rationale behind the adoption of a service-based 
business model. The first graphic in each case depicts the role of an individual actor, flows, and 
contractual agreements between the actors of service triads. Followed by the within-case summary 
table, we explicate contextual factors that shaped dynamics between the triadic actors, indirect 
influences, and key performance implications for each service triad. The last graphic for each case 
is a summary of influences between the actors in a service triad. The title of each case refers to the 
orientation of the actors based on Simmel’s (1950) theorizing of whether actors focus is on self-
interest or the well-being of the triad. For example, the first case is named ‘All for One and One 
for All’ as all of the actors were concerned with the triad. 
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Case 1: “All for One and One for all” 
The service triad in Case 1 was comprised of a customer who manufactured durable 
consumer goods (Processer), an industrial equipment manufacturer (Industrializer), and a 
specialized service supplier (Repairer) - see Figure 1. Processer employed around 1500 people, 
Industrializer 2220, and Repairer 45. The companies were bound to each other with long-lasting 
contracts and had been trading for several years. Processer was buying a solution from Repairer 
for optimizing manufacturing processes and improving the utilization of manufacturing 
equipment. 
 
------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------- 
 
The solution was crucial for maximizing the uptime of the equipment used in Processer’s 
production. The solution was comprised of production equipment manufactured by the 
Industrializer and associated services and spare parts. Processer needed to sign two contracts, one 
with Repairer and another with Industrializer. Repairer was contractually responsible for ensuring 
negotiated levels of Industrializer’s equipment availability for Processer. Services delivered as part 
of the solution included preventive and reactive maintenance and associated spare parts and 
materials. Processer required Industrializer to supply industrial equipment and spare parts, while 
the service provision was performed by Repairer. Industrializer provided Repairer with field 
engineer training and technical data and knowledge and assisted in resolving issues that went 
beyond Repairer’s expertise. Repairer provided training on the maintenance of Industrializer’s 
equipment for Processer’s service engineers. Repairer was the only service supplier able to service 
Industrializer’s equipment and did not provide services for other manufacturers. This was due to 
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the equipment’s technological complexity and the need for significant expertise to facilitate 
effective service provisions.  
Table 3, summarizes contextual factors that shaped control and coordination dynamics 
between the triadic actors in Case 1, and provides examples of control and coordination in direct 
and indirect links. Figure 2 depicts control and coordination paths between the actors in Case 1. 
 
------- Insert Table 3 about here ------- 
------- Insert Figure 2 about here ------- 
Case 2: “All for One (Sometimes) - and One for Themselves (Most of the Time)” 
The triad in Case 2 consisted of a large third-party logistics provider as the customer 
(Freighter), a commercial vehicle manufacturer (Truck), and an independent workshop as the 
service supplier (Mechanic)—see Figure 3. Freighter employed 2040 people, Truck 975 and 
Mechanic 52. All three companies are engaged in long-term relationships with each other. 
Freighter started buying solutions from Truck as a result of a shift in two strategic priorities: a) re-
focus from the purchase price to the total cost of ownership over the asset’s lifecycle and b) focus 
on the core competences—the provision of logistics services—and, therefore, a subsequent closure 
of many of Freighter’s maintenance facilities.  
 
------- Insert Figure 3 about here ------- 
 
The solution or vehicle up-time package was comprised of a commercial vehicle and 
associated services (maintenance, upgrades, and spare parts) provided by Mechanic to Freighter 
on behalf of Truck. The solution, as a package, is designed and configured by Truck and provides 
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Freighter with a contractually agreed level of commercial vehicles available. In this arrangement, 
the manufacturer was the prime contractor and had contractual relationships with the customer, 
while with the service supplier it had a franchise agreement which was mainly prescribing 
infrastructural matters such as the visual identity and cleanliness of the workshop. There was no 
contract between the service supplier and the customer.  
Table 4, summarizes contextual factors that shaped control and coordination dynamics 
between the triadic actors in Case 2, and provides examples of control and coordination in direct 
and indirect links. Figure 4 depicts control and coordination paths between the actors in Case 2. 
 
------- Insert Table 4 about here ------- 
------- Insert Figure 4 about here ------- 
Case 3: “All for (No)One - One for All” 
Case 3 was comprised of a government department responsible for defense as the customer 
(Defender), a service supplier of capital assets (MR&O), and a manufacturer and installer of 
subsystems and equipment (Subsystem)—see Figure 5. The subdivision of Defender that 
interacted with MR&O and Subsystem employed 435 people, MR&O employed 1100 people and 
Subsystem 400. All three firms have been engaged in an exchange for over 15 years. In the past, 
there were long-term, collaborative agreements in place between all three members of the triad. 
However, in the two years preceding the case, MR&O let a long-term agreement lapse with 
Subsystem.  
 
------- Insert Figure 5 about here ------- 
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The move toward a solution in this triad was due to a cut in defense spending by the national 
government of Defender. This meant that Defender outsourced the management of its maintenance 
bases and heavily incentivized suppliers to reduce costs and shorten lead-times. Subsystem had 
become an approved supplier to Defender by developing a solution that significantly reduced the 
through-life costs of maintenance. The contractual arrangements existed between Defender and 
M&RO, but there were no contractual agreements in place between Subsystem and Defender and 
Subsystem and M&RO. 
Table 5, summarizes contextual factors that shaped control and coordination dynamics 
between the triadic actors in Case 3, and provides examples of control and coordination in direct 
and indirect links. Figure 6 depicts control and coordination paths between the actors in Case 3. 
 ------- Insert Table 5 about here ------- 
------- Insert Figure 6 about here ------- 
 
 
 
Cross-Case Analysis and Proposition Development 
Each case was systematically scrutinized and then compared (Miles et al., 2014). In the 
cross-case analysis, we searched for common patterns to formulate propositions. We organized 
propositions around three themes common to all three cases: mediator role and interaction paths, 
the customer as a mediator, and the contextual factors.  
 
Mediator role and interaction paths. To understand how interactions occurred in the triad we 
focused on how control and coordination occurred, directly, and indirectly, through other actors. 
We also discovered that service triads function because two or more actors adopt a coordinating 
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role. This is an extension and refinement of extant theory that posits that triads have one actor who 
takes the role of mediator (e.g., Simmel, 1950; Li & Choi, 2009). To complete the theorizing, we 
generated propositions from the cross-case analysis. 
All actors directly coordinated each other, except for Industrializer in Case 1. This is due 
to the need to align resources and approaches for effective service delivery, which is central to 
service production (cf. Sampson, 2000; Sampson & Froehle, 2006). Resource alignment took place 
in the cases through all customers agreeing on the terms of delivery together with the service 
suppliers—even in Case 2 where the manufacturer was the integrator of the offering. In Cases 1 
and 2, the customers and service suppliers planned maintenance together and redesigned the 
maintenance procedures and/or policies to better fit their particular needs. The use of mutual 
adjustment and feedback mechanisms is common to coordination in interorganizational 
relationships (cf. Nassimbeni, 1998; Sahin & Robinson, 2005). We also witnessed the exertion of 
control mechanisms. In Cases 1 and 3, the customers monitored the service supplier’s delivery 
performance, this is a form of information monitoring (cf. Handley & Benton Jr., 2012b). If 
equipment failure was identified, the customers requested their service suppliers to fix the issues. 
These interactions between customer and service supplier took place over an extended period of 
time.  
In all three case triads, we observed two or more actors who adopted a mediating (cf. 
Simmel, 1950) or Tertius Iungens (cf. Obstfeld, 2005) orientation. These mediators controlled and 
coordinated activities and relationships between actors within the triad. Mediators have access to 
all of the actors and links (through the actors) in a triad. For example, in all three cases, customers 
sought access to information about the interaction between the manufacturers and the service 
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suppliers via proactive review meetings and performance evaluations (Case 1) or more ad-hoc 
approaches to resolve potential issues (Case 2 and Case 3). 
Mediators acted in the interest of the triad – rather than being only self-interested - to 
improve performance and encourage others to coordinate action and interaction. For example, in 
Case 3, the service supplier (Subsystem) actively sought demand information – a form of 
information sharing (a coordination mechanism) - from Defender and MR&O to be able to 
effectively respond to Defender’s requirements. However, it simultaneously encouraged both 
Defender and M&RO to share information with each other. Without the information exchange, 
both M&RO and Subsystem would lose visibility and the opportunity to react to Defender’s needs. 
We observed two or more mediators in each triad in our work. Hence, 
P1: Service triads can have two or more mediators that act for the benefit of the triad. 
 
Actors control and coordinate indirect links through another actors. In this study, seven out of 
nine actors in the triads exerted influence toward the indirect link. This occurred in the service 
triads where the interdependence between actors was high. Here, an actor takes action to affect the 
way the other actors in the triad interact to improve the performance of the triad as a whole. For 
example, the manufacturers in all triads collected performance information on the indirect 
relationship between the customer and service supplier. This is a control mechanism (cf. Handley 
& Benton Jr., 2012b) that provided the manufacturers with information they could use to tackle 
problems. The manufacturers also held tripartite meetings to gain further visibility of the indirect 
link. These interactions came from the manufacturers’ desire to enhance customer satisfaction 
through mutual adjustments (a coordination mechanism). Monitoring the indirect relationships 
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increased the visibility of the relational and performance status and enabled the monitoring parties 
to react in situations where underperformance or emerging relational issues were identified.  
The indirect link was always influenced via another actor, independent of the actors 
involved. The manufacturers always influenced the indirect link through the service providers or 
customers, or in some cases through both. They used the other actor as an intermediary to influence 
the relationship they did not have direct access to. There was not a single instance where this 
influence would have occurred without going through either of the other nodes. This is in contrast 
to what has been previously been suggested in the existing literature (cf. Choi & Wu, 2009a, b). 
Accordingly, we propose the following: 
P2: The control and coordination of an indirect link always occurs via a connected node 
because the node and the link are inseparable. 
 
The customer as mediator in service triads. The influencing of the indirect relationship was 
carried out by seven out of nine actors in the case triads. Only the service suppliers in Cases 2 and 
3 did not attempt to influence the indirect relationship, despite the service supplier being the 
integrator in Case 3. The customers in Cases 2 and 3 reacted whenever performance issues were 
identified and requested their service suppliers and manufacturers to work together. Also, the 
manufacturers in Cases 2 and 3 monitored their indirect links and influenced those links (i.e. 
control). The service suppliers’ positions in Cases 2 and 3 were active only within their own dyads, 
while the customers and manufacturers actively controlled and coordinated the whole triad, 
including the indirect links. The actors collecting information and exerting control on indirect links 
were in an advantageous position in relation to their counterparts involved in only controlling their 
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dyads. The advantage was derived from these actors possessing access to all links, both direct and 
indirect. 
Customers actively took initiative in all three cases to influence their indirect links. This 
was an attempt to improve collaboration between the other two actors to ensure that the solution 
delivered benefits to the customer. In all three triads, the customers faced issues where the 
manufacturer and service supplier needed to collaborate. The customers in Cases 2 and 3 
occasionally encountered issues where the performance of the solution deviated from the agreed 
performance. Processer, the customer in Case 1, once experienced a major issue with the solution 
causing significant production losses. All of the customers required their service suppliers to meet 
with the manufacturers to resolve issues.  
The actors showed similarities in how they influenced the indirect link. Freighter (Case 2) 
exerted control and coordination on the indirect link through Truck (manufacturer), while in Case 
1, Processer exerted influence through both Industrializer and Repairer. In Case 3, Defender 
influenced the indirect link through both MR&O and Subsystem. In all the cases, the actors 
influenced the indirect link through another mediator. When the actors had to exert influence on 
an indirect link, they selected another mediator which created a greater influence on the indirect 
link. From this we derive the third and the fourth proposition, that go as follows: 
P3: In a service triad, one, of the two or three mediators, is always the customer. 
P4: To control and coordinate an indirect link, the customer will always prefer to go 
through another mediator. 
 
Context and the adoption of the mediator’s role. Using solutions created a risk for the 
customers in the three cases, because those were used in their core operations. A possible 
solution failure could have caused expensive downtime and the need to invest in new equipment 
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or to repair existing equipment. These risks varied from case to case, and the customers utilized 
different risk mitigation techniques. In Case 2, the customer’s risk exposure was limited as they 
had substitutable resources (i.e., other commercial vehicles) that could be accessed in case of a 
solution failure. By hiring a commercial vehicle in the short-term, the risk of solution failure 
could be effectively mitigated. The customers in Cases 1 and 3 did not have access to 
substitutable resources and alternative offerings, as these assets were unique and customized for 
them. This was the first identified means of risk mitigation—substitutability.  
In Case 3, the customer had attempted to exert control through contractually specified 
sanctions (cf. van der Valk & van Iwaarden, 2011) on the system integrator that would make up 
for the financial losses of the customer in case of a solution failure. The second means of risk 
mitigation in the cases is through control. Finally, taking an active role in controlling and 
coordinating the triadic interactions was identified as the third type of risk mitigation, which was 
present when the other two means were not. This occurred in Case 3 where Subsystem actively 
sought out information from the other actors in the triad to proactively respond to demand.  
One of the mediators was the customer. Moreover, interdependence and asset specificity 
required at least one other actor in the triad to become a mediator. This was to gain transparency 
on the performance and relationships within the triad for the better coordination of activities. In 
case 1, the other mediator was Truck (manufacturer and integrator) and in Case 3 it was Subsystem, 
who was MR&O’s (integrator) supplier. The integrator in Case 3 was passive in managing the 
indirect link despite the potential contractual sanctions if the solution failed. Common to both of 
these triads was that other risk mitigation measures were in place—this being immediate solution 
substitutes (Case 2) and control through contractual safeguards (Case 3). We posit that because 
these mechanisms were in place, there was perceived to be less need for influencing the indirect 
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link. Thus, two actors in Cases 2 and 3 assumed the mediator role, while in Case 1 all three served 
as mediators. Based on this analysis, we propose the following: 
P5a: When operational risk is high, there are no immediate substitutes and the exertion of 
control through contractual safeguards is not present, all three nodes in the triad will act 
as mediators. 
P5b: When operational risk is low, there are immediate substitutes or control through 
contractual safeguards can be exerted, two nodes in the triad will act as mediators. 
 
In Cases 2 and 3, the solution integrator was a mediator. In Case 3, the integrator was not 
a mediator, which was a result of changes within the relationship. All companies in Case 3 were 
involved in the triad for a long time and had shared strategic information. However, the situation 
had changed within the past few years when Subsystem (manufacturer) redesigned their product. 
This significantly reduced service needs and reduced the sales of MR&O (integrator) to Defender 
for part of the solution. This reduced trust and interaction between the parties. The integrator also 
had employed a large number of Defender’s employees as they transferred across to MR&O when 
the deal was signed. These employees found it difficult to adapt to the commercial realm of MR&O 
and exhibited a passive behavior toward controlling and coordinating relationships. The 
relationships between the parties in Case 3 were not good, and there was considerable strain 
between Defender and MR&O. Conversely, Subsystem had a good relationship with Defender. 
Because of this, it was the manufacturer (Subsystem) instead of the integrator (MR&O) who 
assumed responsibility for coordinating the delivery of the solution and became the other mediator 
in the triad. Accordingly, we propose the following: 
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P6: The other mediator will be the actor with whom the customer has the closest 
relationship. 
 
Control and coordination of the indirect link. There were between-case differences in the way in 
which the indirect links were controlled and coordinated by customers. All three customers 
influenced the indirect link, but some were more active than others. The customers in Cases 2 
(Freighter) and 3 (Defender) were passive and only actively influenced the indirect link when 
matters arose (see Table 3), a control mechanism through controlling the actions of other actors 
within the triad (cf. Chenhall, 2003). They delegated the management of the triad to another actor, 
Truck (manufacturer and integrator) in Case 2 and Subsystem (manufacturer) in Case 3. In both 
cases, the party to whom management of the triad was delegated was also a mediator. Thus, both 
Truck and Subsystem also exerted relational influences on the indirect link. In contrast, the 
customer in Case 2 (Processer) retained coordination responsibilities to stay in control of longer-
term developments. Processer saw active coordination through joint decision-making and 
feedback as crucial for mitigating its risk exposure, which was significant due to downtime costs 
and a lack of both immediate resource substitutability and contractual safeguards. Cases 2 and 3 
were different as the customers had mitigated their risk exposure through different means—
resource substitution in Case 2 and contractual safeguards in Case 3. Because of this risk 
mitigation, the customers felt comfortable adopting more passive roles, where another mediator 
performed the majority of the ongoing relationship management tasks in their triads. They did not 
have a similar need for proactivity as Processer and wanted to focus on their efforts. Figure 7 
shows the differences in context, actors, roles, and behavior in controlling and coordinating service 
triads. Based upon this, we propose the following: 
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P7a: When operational risk is low or there are either contractual safeguards in place or 
immediate substitutes available for the solution, the customer relies on another mediator 
to coordinate the triad but does not relinquish control completely.  
P7b: When operational risk is high and there are neither immediate substitutes nor 
contractual safeguards available for the solution, the customer retains the ongoing control 
and coordination of the triad. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Mismanagement of service triads can lead to serious relationship and performance related 
issues for all involved actors – a manufacturer, a customer, and a service supplier. While our 
knowledge on control and coordination is well developed in dyads, in service triads is at best scarce 
and incomplete. By using an inductive theory-building approach, which relied on data from nine 
companies, forming three service triads, we developed a mid-range theory of control and 
coordination in service triads. With this we make an important theoretical and practical 
contribution to the network literature in OSCM. Researchers, to date, have focused almost 
exclusively upon control in triads (cf. Li & Choi, 2009; Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 2011). Our 
study uncovered, however, that while control is necessary, both, in direct and indirect links of a 
service triad, on its own is not enough for the ongoing effective ‘functioning’ of service triads. 
Both, control and coordination mechanisms, are necessary as there may be a passive actor within 
the triad that is still perceived to be powerful (i.e. Defender in Case 3) but not engaged in the 
control and coordination of the triad. This means that coordination is shared between multiple 
actors and it is context dependent. Moreover, in transitive service triads the performance of the 
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collective is dependent on individual actors bonding together, which is why we see mediators 
rather than bridges, as for example in the work of Li and Choi, (2009). While the mediator displays 
traits of retaining individual control through interaction with and monitoring of the other two actors 
and the indirect relationship between them, it simultaneously uses coordination through 
information sharing and mutual adjustment. The main concern of the mediator is a risk of 
individual and collective failure due to the performance interdependence between the three actors.  
Our mid-range theory stems from these critical observations. In Figure 7 we summate the 
empirical propositions from which the theoretical framework of control and coordination in service 
triads was developed. The theory captures control and coordination in service triads around four 
key areas: 1) How many mediators control and coordinates in a service triad; 2) who in a service 
triad acts as a mediator; 3) how control and coordination is performed, and; 4) what contextual 
factors affect the first three areas.   
 
------- Insert Figure 7 about here ------ 
 The first key area addressed is the contingent nature of control and coordination in service 
triads. This is an important insight as to the best of our knowledge, no studies of service triads to 
date (e.g. Li and Choi, 2009; Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 2011; Van Iwaarden & Van der Valk, 
2013), have explored the relationship between the context and control and/or coordination in 
service triads. We identified four contextual factors: customer’s exposure to business and 
operational risk due to potential failure of the offering (i.e. solution); the offering’s immediate 
substitutability; the absence or presence of contractual safeguards, and relationship closeness with 
the customer. These factors affect all three remaining areas of our theory – i.e. the number of 
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mediators in a service triad, who in a service triad acts as a mediator as well as how is control and 
coordination performed.  
The extant literature on control and coordination in service triads focuses on one actor; a 
service outsourcer (e.g., Li & Choi, 2009) or solution integrator (Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 
2011; Bastl et al., 2012; Van Iwaarden & Van der Valk, 2013; Finne & Holmström, 2013; Karatzas 
et al., 2016). By broadening the empirical focus in this study, from a single actor, to all three actors 
and their relationships in a triad, we uncovered that control and coordination is a shared 
responsibility of two or three actors, depending on the context, usually involving the manufacturer 
and the customer. For example, when the customer’s exposure to risk is low, and immediate 
substitutability of the offering on the supply market is high, the intensity of a customer’s efforts in 
coordinating the triad decreases, and the primary manufacturer carries a more prominent role (i.e. 
Case 2). However, in situations of high-risk exposure and low substitutability of the offering 
combined with the absence of contractual safeguards, all three actors—the customer, the 
manufacturer, and the service supplier—adopt the role of mediators (i.e. Case 1).  
Furthermore, we uncovered that the customers’ role specifically, transcends the role of 
providing inputs to the service production process (cf. Sampson, 2000; Sampson & Froehle, 2006) 
toward a much more complex role involving coordinating the interaction with manufacturers and 
service suppliers as well as monitoring and mediating in direct and indirect relationships. While 
the customer always acts as a mediator in a service triad, it is the relationship closeness between 
the customer and either, the manufacturer or the service supplier, that dictates who will be the 
second mediator in the context of low operational risk, available alternatives and presence of 
contractual safeguards. Not only is the role of the customer much more complex than previously 
thought, we also found that customers never relinquish control in a service triad. The retention of 
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this role allows the customer, as well as any other actor in the service triad, to maintain triad-level 
visibility, control and coordination over the provision of the customer offering from the two triadic 
actors, the early detection of potential issues in direct and indirect relationships, and the ability to 
influence the behavior of individual actors.  In addition, we showed that in situations, when only 
two actors act as mediators, the customer will prefer to exert the control and coordination via 
another mediator.  
Lastly, the extant literature on management of transitive triads frequently depicts that an 
actor (i.e. a node) in a triad (e.g. the manufacturer) exerts the control, (Li and Choi, 2009) or 
manages the indirect link (Choi & Wu, 2009a, b) by directly influencing the indirect link (e.g. the 
relationship between the service supplier and the customer). In this way the managing actor 
somewhat bypasses’ the two connected actors, suggesting the nodes and the link between them are 
separate. We propose a refinement of this logic and posit that any indirect link is controlled and 
coordinated via a connected node, because the two – the node and the link are inseparable and in 
order to control and coordinate in the indirect link, one has to control and coordinate behavior of 
a node displayed in this indirect link. For example, the manufacturer has to control behavior and 
coordinate actions of the service supplier, which service supplier then displays in the relationship 
towards the customer.  
Our study also has important practical implications. Manufacturers who are transitioning 
from manufacturing outsourcing models to service-based ones should adopt the role of mediators. 
The adoption of this role will likely require a mindset shift from the traditional self-interest role 
seen often in manufacturing outsourcing models to a more shared and system-oriented one, where 
management is not only focused on the performance-of-self but also on the performance-of-all (i.e. 
a Tertius Iungens orientation). Moreover, we indicate to managers that the effective control and 
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coordination of service triads requires action to influence both direct and indirect relationships. 
Indirect relational influences matter for all actors in the triad. By understanding and influencing 
the indirect links, managers can reduce the amount of information asymmetry, leading to reduced 
risk on one side as well as improved performance on the other. Lastly, managers should be aware 
that the approach to the control and coordination of service triads is not contingency free. In fact, 
the identified contingency factors will shape the needs and expectations from all three actors—the 
customer, the manufacturer, and the service supplier—on how and to what extent they are going 
to be involved in the triadic interactions.  
 
Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
Our study is not without limitations. As we adopted a theory-building approach, there is 
reduced testing of external validity, leading to limited generalizability. Further research can 
move from theory building to theory testing as we have developed the foundations for further 
development (cf. Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). Next, we framed service triads and subsequently 
selected cases as transitive in which all three actors are connected through relationships and 
where significant bi-directional exchange is taking place. In this way, we excluded service triads 
involving the provision of mixed services or quasi-manufacturing services (Chase, 1981). Lastly, 
given that we developed our mid-range theory on the smallest unit of network – i.e. a triad, a 
natural extension of this work would be to test and refine our propositions on a larger network. In 
this way we would gain important insights which key areas of our theory hold as the complexity 
of a supply network grows and which don’t.  
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TABLE 1 
Mechanisms for exerting control and coordination in inter-organizational relationships 
Control 
Exerted through: structural position (Li & Choi, 2009), contracts (Van der Valk & Van Iwaarden, 2011; 
Van Iwaarden & Van der Valk, 2013), power (Handley & Benton Jr., 2012a; 2012b), information 
monitoring (Handley & Benton Jr., 2012b), operating procedures, action and diagnostic controls 
(Chenhall, 2003) 
Coordination 
Exerted through: information sharing (Sahin & Robinson, 2005), mutual adjustment (Nassimbeni, 1998), 
decision-making and feedback mechanisms (Gulati et al. 2012) 
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TABLE 2 
Case Participants and Interview Details 
Cases 
Company 
[confidential 
alias] 
Participants No. of 
interviews 
Business functions Seniority 
Case 1 
Customer 
[Processer] 
Purchasing (1) 
Technical department (2) 
Repair and maintenance (2) 
Top management (2) 
Middle management (3) 
5 
Service supplier 
[Repairer] 
Key account—sales (1) 
Project management (2) 
Service and spare parts (1) 
Top management (1) 
Middle management (3) 
4 
Manufacturer 
[Industrializer] 
Manufacturing (1) 
Key account—sales (1) 
Customer support (1) 
Top management (1) 
Middle management (2) 
3 
Case 2 
Customer  
[Freighter] 
Head office (1) 
Purchasing (1) 
Top management (1) 
Middle management (1) 
2 
Service Supplier 
[Mechanic] 
Head office (1) 
Customer service (1) 
Repair and maintenance (1) 
Top management (1) 
Middle management (1) 
Operations (1) 
3 
Manufacturer 
[Truck] 
Key account—sales (3) 
Key account—aftermarket (1) 
Service design (1) 
Repair and maintenance (1) 
Customer service (1) 
Top management (3) 
Middle management (4) 
7 
Case 3 
Customer 
[Defender] 
Purchasing (1) 
Project management (1) 
Middle management (2) 2 
Service supplier 
[MR&O] 
Supply chain management (1) 
Project management (3) 
Top management (3) 
Middle management (1) 
4 
Manufacturer 
[Subsystem] 
Head office (1) 
Key account—sales and customer 
support (1) 
Supply chain management (1) 
Top management (1) 
Middle management (2) 
3 
   Total: 33 
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Case 1 - Contextual Factors and Control and Coordination Examples in Direct and Indirect Links 
 
 
 Case 1 
(Processor – Customer, Industrializer – Manufacturer, Repairer – Service Supplier) 
Contextual factors that 
shaped control and 
coordination dynamics 
 Control and Coordination in direct links Control and Coordination in indirect links 
 Customer’s  
actions 
Manufacturer’s 
actions 
Service supplier’s 
actions 
Customer’s  
actions 
Manufacturer’s 
actions 
Service supplier’s 
actions 
1. Customer’s risk exposure due to the 
solution failure:  
 High—Processor’s production 
downtime costs ranging from 
$19,500-26,000 per hour. 
 
2. Immediate substitutability of the 
offering:  
 Low—due to technological 
complexity of the asset and 
specialized knowledge required 
from Repairer. 
 
3. Contractual safeguards:  
 Processor did not devise explicit 
contractual safeguards that would 
have offset the potential damage of 
the offering failure. 
 
4. Relationship closeness:  
 Processor-Repairer: Long-term, 
cooperative relationship, frequent 
sharing of strategic and operational 
information. 
 Processor-Industrializer: Long-
term, cooperative, occasional 
sharing of operational and tactical 
information.  
 Industrializer-Repairer: Long-term, 
cooperative, frequent sharing of 
strategic and operational 
information. 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
 Processor measures 
Industrializer’s 
performance of spare 
parts delivery on the 
ongoing basis. 
 Processor measures 
service level 
performance of 
Repairer. 
 Processor and Repairer 
jointly agree 
contractual terms on 
solution delivery. 
 Industrializer provides 
training on new product 
functionalities and 
maintenance for 
Repairer’s engineers. 
 Industrializer and 
Repairer jointly agree 
contractual terms on 
solution delivery. 
 Repairer sets 
performance targets to 
Industrializer in 
response to availability 
agreement with the 
Processor. 
 Repairer provides 
maintenance training 
for Processor service 
engineers. 
 Processor developed 
proactive and ongoing 
review meetings with 
Industrializer and 
Repairer to discuss past 
performance, future 
plans, and encourage 
continuous 
improvement.  
 Processor got involved 
in joint problem 
resolution between 
Industrializer and 
Repairer on “as-
needed” basis.  
 
 Industrializer requested 
from Repairer 
information on 
customer needs and 
installed equipment to 
enable process 
improvements toward 
Processor. 
 Industrializer provided 
information on spare 
parts and service 
processes to Repairer to 
inform contract design 
between Repairer and 
Processor. 
 
 Repairer involved 
Industrializer in 
business set-up 
activities, such as 
process and 
infrastructure set-up as 
a response to 
Processor’s 
requirements. 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
 m
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
 Processor requests from 
Repairer resolution of 
malfunctioning 
equipment on ad-hoc 
basis. 
 Processor arranges 
maintenance planning 
meetings together with 
Industrializer. 
 Processor requests 
deliveries from 
Industrializer. 
 Industrializer seeks 
feedback from Repairer 
on service delivery 
performance towards 
Processer. 
 Industrializer provides 
expertise on its 
products to Repairer to 
help resolving 
equipment 
malfunctioning at 
Processer. 
  Processor developed 
proactive and ongoing 
review meetings with 
Industrializer and 
Repairer to discuss past 
performance, future 
plans, and encourage 
continuous 
improvement.  
 Industrializer 
participated in issue 
resolution between 
Repairer and Processor. 
 Repairer participated in 
joint problem resolution 
between Processor and 
Industrializer. 
 Repairer involved 
Industrializer in 
equipment repair at 
Processor’s site, when 
knowledge required to 
rectify an issue 
exceeded Repairer’s 
and Processor’s 
engineering expertise. 
 Repairer intervenes in 
the relationship 
between Industrializer 
and Processer to ensure 
customer satisfaction. 
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TABLE 4:  
Case 2 - Contextual Factors and Control and Coordination Examples in Direct and Indirect Links 
 
 Case 2 
(Freighter – Customer, Truck – Manufacturer, Mechanic – Service Supplier)  
Contextual factors that 
shaped control and 
coordination dynamic 
 Control and Coordination in direct links Control and Coordination in indirect links 
 Customer’s  
actions 
Manufacturer’s 
actions 
Service supplier’s 
actions 
Customer’s  
actions 
Manufacturer’s 
actions 
Service supplier’s 
actions 
1. Customer’s risk exposure due to the 
solution failure:  
 Medium—in the case of short-term 
issues.  
 Low—in the case of long-term 
issues. 
 
2. Immediate substitutability of 
solution: 
 High—substitution possible via 
alternative service suppliers or 
from within Freighter’s own fleet.  
 
3. Contractual safeguards:  
 Truck contractually responsible to 
Freighter for the achievement of 
Mechanic’s performance targets.  
 
4. Relationship closeness:  
 Freighter-Truck: Long-term, 
cooperative relationship, 
occasional sharing of strategic 
information. 
 Freighter-Mechanic: Long-term, 
cooperative, frequent sharing of 
operational and tactical 
information. 
 Truck-Mechanic: Long-term, 
cooperative, frequent sharing of 
strategic and operational 
information.  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
 Freighter and Mechanic 
jointly agree 
performance 
requirements for 
solution delivery. 
 Freighter requests 
Mechanic to comply 
with requirements for 
maintenance processes 
and procedures and 
adjusts them 
accordingly. 
 Truck and Freighter 
jointly agree 
contractual terms on 
solution delivery. 
 Truck and Mechanic 
jointly agree 
contractual terms 
around solution 
delivery. 
 
 Mechanic is measuring 
its own performance on 
service delivery by 
collecting performance 
data internally and from 
the Freighter. 
 Freighter developed 
ad-hoc, reactive 
approach to issue 
resolution between 
Truck and Mechanic. 
 Truck prescribed 
specifications and 
procedures for 
Mechanic’s service 
delivery toward 
Freighter. 
 Truck continuously 
monitored service 
performance of 
Mechanic toward 
Freighter. 
 No control or 
coordination exerted in 
the indirect link. 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
 m
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
  Truck ongoingly 
discusses business 
issues with Mechanic 
that pertain to Truck-
Mechanic dyad. 
 Mechanic solves 
problems with Freighter 
in case of sub-optimal 
service delivery. 
  Truck interacted with 
Mechanic to address 
occasional issues 
related to service 
delivery sub-
performance. 
 Truck held tri-partite 
meetings when issues 
exceed Mechanic’s 
resolution authority. 
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TABLE 5 
Case 3 - Contextual Factors and Control and Coordination Examples in Direct and Indirect Links 
 Case 3 
(Defender – Customer, Subsystem – Manufacturer, M&RO – Service Supplier)  
Contextual factors that 
shaped control and 
coordination dynamic 
 Control and Coordination in direct links Control and Coordination in indirect links 
 Customer’s  
actions 
Manufacturer’s 
actions 
Service supplier’s 
actions 
Customer’s  
actions 
Manufacturer’s 
actions 
Service 
supplier’s actions 
Control and Coordination in Service Triads   
1. Customer’s risk exposure due to 
the solution failure:  
 High—on the “critical 
path”. Liquidated 
damages of $150,000 
per day for late return of 
asset to service. 
 
2. Immediate substitutability of 
offering:  
 Low—due to 
uniqueness of 
Subsystem’s products 
and MR&O’s services. 
 
3. Contractual safeguards:  
 MR&O is contractually 
obliged for delivery of 
integrated solution. 
Significant liquidated 
damages could be 
claimed by Defender in 
case of failed solution 
delivery.  
 
4. Relationship closeness: 
 Defender-MR&O: 
Long-term, strained 
relationship, limited 
sharing of strategic 
information.  
 Defender-Subsystem: 
Long-term, somewhat 
cooperative, frequent 
sharing of strategic and 
operational information.  
 Subsystem-MR&O: 
long-term, somewhat 
cooperative, frequent 
sharing of tactical and 
strategic information. 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
 Defender requests from 
M&RO to deliver 
service. 
 Defender monitors 
M&RO performance  
 Defender requests 
equipment and service 
delivery from 
Subsystem 
 Subsystem and 
Defender jointly agree 
contractual terms on 
asset delivery. 
 Subsystem talks 
regularly with 
Defender to monitor 
status and demand. 
 M&RO requests from 
Subsystem delivery of 
equipment and 
service. 
 M&RO orders 
equipment and 
services from 
Subsystem. 
 
   Subsystem encourages 
MR&O to request from 
Defender to place 
orders. 
 No control or 
coordination exerted 
in the indirect link. 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
 m
ec
h
an
is
m
s 
  Subsystem assists 
M&RO with relational 
or performance issues. 
 Subsystem requires 
information disclosure 
from service supplier 
to gain demand 
visibility 
 
   Defender adopts ad-
hoc, reactive approach 
to issue resolution 
between Subsystem and 
MR&O. 
 Subsystem takes over 
the role of the solution 
delivery coordination. 
It communicates with 
Defender and MR&O 
in order to understand 
the nature of demand 
and to ensure that 
information is shared 
between all members 
of the triad. 
 
  
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FIGURE 1  
Case 1 - Flows and Contractual Agreements 
 
FIGURE 2  
Case 1 - Control and Coordination Paths Among the Service Triad Actors 
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FIGURE 3  
Case 2 - Flows and Contractual Agreements 
 
FIGURE 4  
Case 2 - Control and Coordination Paths Among the Service Triad Actors 
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FIGURE 5 
Case 3 - Flows and Contractual Agreements 
 
 
FIGURE 6  
Case 3 – Control and Coordination Paths Among the Service Triad Actors 
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FIGURE 7  
A summary of propositions and the theoretical framework of control and coordination in service triads  
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APPENDIX A 
Exemplary Quotes and Codes 
TABLE A-1 
Overview of Exemplary Quotes and Their Relationship with Focused Codes 
Indicative quotes  Open codes  Focused codes 
“The reason why we made this service agreement with [Repairer] was based to 
acknowledge that we had too often shutdowns based by [Industrializer’s 
equipment]. […] And we saw after the several years that we have to do 
something more organized system for the [equipment]. […] During that time 
when we with our own staff started to keep them running. But we didn’t have 
enough time […].” (Head of Process Automation, Processer) Customer Strategic 
Objectives 
Influencing 
Context 
“You tend to find a lot of owner/operators, they only concentrate on one thing 
and that's the cost of ownership of that vehicle, what it costs and what they're 
making. […] And you find a lot of the problems with that are generated around 
vehicles that are not dealer maintained. You tend to find a lot of the drivers that 
maintain their own vehicles, they'll only come to a dealership when they've got 
a specific problem that they can't fix.” (Regional Manager, Freighter) 
“Service and repair support for their vehicles. […] Yes, they offer, any 
customer in fact a number of different services but we need to make sure that 
we are, if you like, fully ready to support that product by investment in staff 
and training and knowledge and then really I suppose what customers’ 
expectations are as well, so it is very much a symbiotic relationship where we 
work in harmony or try to at least to provide a top level service so that the 
customer will buy [Truck] and continue to buy [Truck].” (Managing Director, 
Mechanic) 
Content of 
Exchange 
“Annual maintenance of the [equipment]. If there’s needed only inspections we 
have just treated them and we have maintenance schedule. […] There can be 
only an inspection or if there’s needed then we’ll change components, ageing 
components, predefined component sets called [preventive maintenance] kits. 
[…] And for the each year each [piece of equipment] has a thing that needs to 
be done during that year.” (Project Engineer, Repairer) 
“[…] we just finally found out that it’s easier to keep everything to [Repairer] 
and we started to negotiate with them what they can offer. [Repairer] staff came 
in and they introduce trade service system, what kind of system they have, what 
kind of planning they have, and how they can do it. […] So [Repairer] spent 
here plenty of time opening all the cabinets and evaluate what kind of price 
there is and then they took out the serial numbers so they could nowadays 
evaluate exactly in which cabinet is what [piece of equipment].” (Head of 
Process Automation, Processer) 
History 
“About 15 years ago [Subsystem] proactively engaged [Defender] with a view 
to trying to get our products specified, specifically fittings. One of the key 
systems that the design authorities look after is the [MR&O’s] system on 
[Defender’s equipment]. It’s fair to say the [Subsystem’s] system is a critical 
system […].” (Business Development Manager, Subsystem) 
“We can assist them with it. We obviously can’t dictate to them, to say that you 
must do this, you must do more nights, because if they don’t do that facility, 
then... and it isn’t cost effective, they won’t do it. But hopefully we can say that 
look, this is what [Freighter], as a customer demand, what can you and what 
can’t you achieve that.” (After-market Account Manager, Truck)  
Information sharing 
– in a direct link 
Coordination 
mechanisms in a 
direct link 
“Because we have this service and preventative maintenance agreement with 
them [Repairer], we have two meetings annually. So, the first meeting we 
always have in springtime where we think what kind of overhaul and 
preventative maintenance they are going to manage during our summer 
shutdown because every summer we stop production for two, three weeks.” 
(Head of Process Automation, Processer) 
Information sharing 
– in a direct link 
“An example again, so now you are going to [Processer] and in this case there 
is [a Repairer] service engineer in [Processer], he is working in the factory, for 
example in the [Processer] factory. And then he says, ‘Oh I need something 
very quickly.’ […] He might call me directly and then he says what is the 
problem and what is needed. I’ll check from the SAP quickly, do we have that 
Decision making 
and feedback in 
indirect link 
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and what solutions we could offer to him and what is the delivery time and then 
I can work directly with our customer service people who are handling the 
[local] service and then we can put the material on its way and they can handle 
the order later.” (Head of Supply of Electrical Equipment, Industrializer) 
(Decision making and feedback leading to mutual adjustment (coordination)) 
 
 
Coordination 
mechanisms in an 
indirect link “On day to day issues, things like that, [Mechanic] know they could speak to 
us [Truck] and we would support them in whichever way we needed to. 
Sometimes Steve [from Truck] will make a commercial decision to cover the 
cost of a repair because it’s not really under contract and it’s not … [Freighter] 
don’t want to be and it’s certainly not [Mechanic’s] problem. So sometimes 
Steve would step in and to support the overall relationship he would take that 
small problem away.” (Key Account Manager, Truck) 
Mutual adjustment 
in an indirect link 
“The only incentives are through the parts target which if we reach a purchase 
target from [Truck], we get a rebate and the monetary rewards through the UTP 
scheme which in our size dealership, that’s worth about 100,000 pounds a year 
Sterling, which is a fair chunk of money.” (Head of Service and Repair, 
Mechanic) 
Formal contracts – 
in a direct link 
Control 
mechanisms in a 
direct link 
“[…] within that book of reference with specific regard to our kit, it says 
anyone undertaking work with our kit must go through a certified 
[Subsystem’s] installer’s course. So, I actually work with the [Defender] to 
write that specification into the BR, so typically the work package will come 
with that caveat, so when [MR&O] are quoting for that work package they must 
come to us and ask us to quote for the training aspect of it as well.” (Business 
Development Manager, Subsystem) 
Action control in 
indirect link 
Control 
mechanisms in an 
indirect link 
 
 
 
 
 
